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ABSTRACT
Latin American countries are the only Western countries that are poor and that aren't gaining ground
on the United States. This paper evaluates why Latin America has not replicated Western economic
success. We find that this failure is primarily due to TFP differences. Latin America's TFP gap is not
plausibly accounted for by human capital differences, but rather reflects inefficient production. We
argue that competitive barriers are a promising channel for understanding low Latin TFP. We
document that Latin America has many more international and domestic competitive barriers than
do Western and successful East Asian countries. We also document a number of microeconomic
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Various short-run crises–exchange rate crises, debt crises, inﬂation crises, balance-
of-payment crises, ﬁnancial crises–have dominated recent macroeconomic research about
Latin America. This literature focuses on the causes of these crises and their short-run
impact on macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, taking the trend paths of macroeconomic variables as
exogenous. Systematic analyses of Latin American macroeconomic trends have received much
less attention.1 This paper presents a comparative analysis of Latin American macroeconomic
trends over the last 50 years using a neoclassical growth framework.
We ﬁrst compare long-run Latin American macroeconomic performance to that in a
number of other countries to provide a benchmark for what Latin America could have rea-
sonably achieved. We make two sets of comparisons. We compare Latin America’s long-run
performance to that in a peer group of other Western market economies–the other coun-
tries with a large fraction of citizens of Western European descent. This comparison shows
that all Western countries–including those with initial income levels reasonably similar to
those in Latin America in 1950–have made substantial progress in catching up to the United
States. In sharp contrast, no Latin American country has made any signiﬁcant progress in
catching up to the United States. We also compare Latin America to a number of East Asian
countries that had initial income levels equal to or lower than those in Latin America in
1950. These countries also have had substantial catch-up. These comparisons motivate the
question we address: Why can’t Latin America catch up to its Western peer countries and
to the successful East Asian countries?
To gain a better understanding of Latin America’s stagnation, we decompose per
capita GDP for Latin America and the other countries into two components: output per
worker and employment as a fraction of the adult population. This comparison shows that
Latin America’s stagnation is primarily the consequence of a labor productivity failure; Latin
American labor productivity has failed to gain any ground on U.S. labor productivity over the
last 50 years. In contrast, the development successes of all the other countries are largely the
consequence of labor productivity successes; labor productivity in all of these other countries
is catching up to U.S. labor productivity. Understanding Latin America’s relative stagnation
1Elias (1992) is an exception.
1requires understanding its relative productivity stagnation.
We report two main ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that stagnant relative total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) is the key determinant of Latin America’s relative income and labor productivity
stagnation. Second, we ﬁnd that a human capital diﬀerence is not the key determinant of
Latin America’s TFP gap, but that barriers to competition are a promising factor. We draw
this latter conclusion because both the breadth and depth of Latin American competitive
barriers far exceed those in the Western countries or in East Asia, and because there are
a number of microeconomic cases in Latin America in which large changes in the size of
competitive barriers are systematically followed by large productivity changes. In particular,
big increases in barriers to competition are followed by large productivity decreases, and big
decreases in these barriers are followed by large productivity increases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a neoclassical model for orga-
nizing our investigation. Section 3 compares Latin America’s output to that in Europe and
East Asia. Section 4 decomposes Latin American output into its labor productivity and em-
ployment components and investigates the source of low Latin American labor productivity.
Section 5 quantiﬁes how much of Latin America’s TFP gap can be accounted for by human
capital. Section 6 discusses theoretical models in which competitive barriers lead to low pro-
ductivity. Section 7 documents that Latin America has erected a number of domestic and
international barriers to competition that signiﬁcantly exceed competitive barriers in either
Europe or East Asia. Section 8 presents a number of empirical microeconomic cases that
document how government policies that limit competition have signiﬁcantly reduced TFP in
some Latin American countries. Section 9 concludes.
2. A Neoclassical Framework
We use the neoclassical growth model to guide our analysis. In this closed economy






where βi is the discount factor for country i, ui is the preference for consumption and labor in
country i in period t, Cit is consumption, and Lit is labor supply. The population is denoted
2by Nit and is normalized to be one in period 0. The population of country i grows at the
constant rate of ni :
Nit =( 1+ni)
t.






it ≥ Cit + Xit,
where Ait is TFP, Kit is capital services, Lit is labor services, and Xit is investment. The law
of motion for capital is given by
Kit+1 = Xit +( 1− δ)Kit,K i0 given.
The process Ait is the product of two components, as in Parente and Prescott (2004):
Ait = ηitAt, 0 <η it ≤ 1,
where At is the world technology frontier and ηit is the relative eﬃciency of country i in using
that technology. For our empirical analysis, we will assume that U.S. TFP is a reasonable
proxy for the world technology frontier, which implies that ηUS =1 . For our purposes, the
process generating At is unimportant, though at certain points we will ﬁnd it convenient to
assume that it grows at the constant rate γ. The relative eﬃciency term η is a key component
in our model. For present purposes, we treat this as a parameter.
This simple model generates long-run income diﬀerences between countries through
two channels: (1) through the relative eﬃciency term η and (2) through diﬀerences in the
relative supplies of capital and labor, which in our model are governed by country-speciﬁc
preference diﬀerences. Note that any factor that aﬀects income in the long-run–such as tax
distortions–will manifest itself as a change in either one or both of these two channels.2 We
2For example, capital income tax diﬀerences would show up as a diﬀerence in the relative discount factor,
3will ﬁrst use this model to gauge how important these two channels are for understanding
Latin American macroeconomic development. We will then evaluate the deeper factors that
lie behind the diﬀerences in eﬃciency or relative employment of the factors of production in
Latin America.
3. Latin America’s Persistent Economic Stagnation
This section examines Latin America’s long-run macroeconomic performance, which
we measure as per capita income relative to that of the world frontier (U.S. per capita
income). Interpreting the income gap between Latin America and the United States requires
a benchmark that lets us assess how large of a gap should be expected today, and how much
this gap should have changed over the last 50 years.
We construct an empirical benchmark for assessing Latin American development. We
do this by forming a set of peer group countries for Latin America and by measuring the
income gaps in the peer group relative to the United States over the last 50 years. We
treat the income gaps between the peer group and the United States as a benchmark for
interpreting the income gap between Latin America and the United States.
The peer group is the countries that we assume are similar to Latin America in their
ability to adopt and learn new technologies and that are similar in their preferences for market
goods. In terms of the language of our model, this means we are looking for countries that
have the ability to achieve similar levels of ηi and that have similar βi and ui(Ci,L i).B e c a u s e
Latin America is signiﬁcantly populated by individuals of European descent, we deﬁne the
peer group to be the other Western countries: the Western/Northern/Southern European
nations, plus the countries that have been signiﬁcantly populated by Europeans and in which
European religion, language, and culture have been dominantly established.3
Our organizing view for this peer group is that since the Europeans who populated
these regions established Western religion, language, and culture, then it should have been
feasible for them to replicate the successful economies of the West. More speciﬁcally, this
and labor income tax diﬀerences would show up as a diﬀerence in the relative preference for leisure.
3The peer group is Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece, France, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands, Italy, Australia, Austria, Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, Iceland,
Greenland, Germany, and the United States.
4commonality leads us to assume that Latin America and the other Western countries should
have the same innate ability to learn and adopt successful Western technologies, and that
with similar cultures, they should have similar preferences for market goods.
Our assumption that similar cultures have similar preferences for market goods follows
in part from Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), who established a formal connection
between culture and preference orderings. In their framework, cultural diﬀerences between
countries can lead to diﬀerences in nonmarket rewards for market activities. There are self-
enforcing social arrangements in their model in which nonmarket goods are allocated on the
basis of wealth or income. This implies reduced form diﬀerences in preference orderings over
market goods according to cultural diﬀerences and suggests a presumption that countries
with similar cultures will have similar preferences for market goods.
By comparing Latin America to these peer countries, we will interpret income diﬀer-
ences between Latin America and the peer group as idiosyncratic Latin American choices
that diﬀerentially aﬀect either the eﬃciency of production or the employment of the fac-
tors of production or both. We will use the term “policy choices” to broadly refer to these
idiosyncratic Latin American eﬀects.
Table 1 shows ethnic, language, and religion characteristics for Latin America’s pop-
ulation.4 The table shows that Latin America is a Western region by these characteristics–
Latin America experienced substantial European immigration and widely adopted European
languages and religion. Regarding culture, a number of scholars argue that Western culture
has had a substantial impact on Latin America and, in some cases, nearly wiped out native
cultures. (See Hoogvelt 2001 and the references therein.)
Figure 1 shows per capita income for Latin America and the other Western countries.
Income is measured as a percentage of U.S. real GDP per capita (Maddison 2001). The
ﬁgure shows that the Latin American countries are the poorest Western countries. In partic-
ular, note that Western European emigrants were able to transform the regions that became
Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand into rich countries. In contrast,
Latin America was unable to replicate this Western success. The average Latin American
4We include the major Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay.
5income is just 22 percent of U.S. income, compared to an average of 69 percent for the other
Western countries.
We next assess how these relative income gaps have either narrowed or widened over
time. Figure 2 shows per capita income between 1950 and 2000 for the population-weighted
average of the Latin American countries and for the population-weighted average of the other
Western countries that had similar income levels to Latin America in 1950. The ﬁgure shows
that all the other poor Western countries have had signiﬁcant catch-up over the last 50 years.
The average European country in this group increased from 40 percent of U.S. income in
1950 to 67 percent in 2000. In contrast, Latin America lost ground, falling from 28 percent
of the U.S. level in 1950 to 22 percent in 2000.
The ﬁgure also shows relative per capita income for some East Asian countries with
initial income levels similar to or below the Latin American level in 1950. The data show that
economic success can also be achieved by non-Western countries, and that Latin America
is also signiﬁcantly underperforming this group. The population-weighted average Asian
country increased from 16 percent of U.S. income in 1950 to 57 percent in 2000. Latin
America’s underperformance relative to Asia is signiﬁcant, because Latin America–as a
Western country–should have had an advantage over Asia in copying and adopting the
successful Western technologies and practices that made the West rich.5
Table 2 shows the average relative incomes for these three groups, and Figures 3—5
show relative incomes for each of the individual countries in the three groups over the 1950—
2000 period. Figure 5 shows that not a single Latin American country has had any signiﬁcant
catch-up. The Latin American income gaps are just as wide, and for some countries wider,
today as they were in 1950.
Perhaps the most striking feature of these data is the constancy of Latin America’s
relative stagnation. This “relative gap” measure of Latin American macroeconomic perfor-
mance paints a diﬀerent picture than that suggested by the more commonly used measure
of GDP growth. In particular, the two measures tell a diﬀerent story about post-1950 Latin
5We chose those European and East Asian countries that had 60 percent or less of the U.S. per capita
income level and increased their relative positions by at least 10 percentage points by 2001. The European
countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and
Spain. The Asian countries are Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
6American performance. Latin America did have higher growth before 1980 than after. How-
ever, according to our preferred relative gap measure, there is no signiﬁcant Latin American
catch-up during the pre-debt crisis period (1950—80), because the U.S. economy grew faster
during the earlier period as well. Output was 28 percent of the U.S. level in 1950 and 30 per-
cent in 1980. There was, however, substantial catch-up in the other regions. The European
countries rose from 40 percent of U.S. per capita income to 70 percent of U.S. per capita
income, and the Asian countries rose from 16 percent of U.S. per capita income to 46 percent
of U.S. per capita income over the 1950—79 period. Thus, while Latin America was treading
water in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s relative to the United States, the rest of these countries
were moving rapidly ahead.6
These data show that Latin America’s long-standing stagnation is not the consequence
of adverse shocks occurring in the post-debt crisis period. How long have these stagnation
factors been in place? Maddison’s (2001) data suggest they may have persisted over the last
century. Table 3 shows relative Latin American income in 1900, 1950, 1980, and 2001. These
data show that Latin America’s stagnation has been the norm for the last 100 years. Latin
American per capita income was 29 percent in 1900, almost exactly where it was in 1950
and slightly above where it was in 2001.7 For the 10 countries that we have data for over
this earlier period, per-adult income in 5 of these countries has remained roughly unchanged
relative to the United States. Argentina and Chile lost substantial ground relative to the
United States during this period. Argentinian income fell from 67 percent of the U.S. level in
1900 to 52 percent by 1950, and Chilean income fell from 48 percent to 40 percent of the U.S.
level by 1950. Venezuela was the only country that gained ground, rising from 20 percent of
the U.S. level in 1900 to 78 percent by 1950. This impressive gain (which was in part due
to Venezuela’s oil exports), however, was largely lost after 1950, as Venezuela returned to 30
percent of U.S. income by 2001.
It is also possible to make even longer-run relative income comparisons, though mea-
6This pre-debt crisis stagnation also emerges in 11 of the 13 individual Latin American countries (except
Mexico and Brazil). Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2004) have recently argued that stagnation and then collapse
more accurately describes the last 50 years for Latin America.
7We have data back to 1900 for all of our Latin American countries except Costa Rica, Boliva, and
Paraguay, and these countries are small enough not to have substantially aﬀected this average.
7surement issues become more problematic. These data suggest an even longer period of
stagnation or decline. Speciﬁcally, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) estimate that Argentina
was richer than the United States in 1800 and that Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru had
smaller relative income gaps in 1800 than they do today.
Latin America’s relative stagnation is particularly puzzling when compared to the two
other major stagnant regions–Africa and the Middle East. Like Latin America, neither of
these two regions has gained ground on the United States in the last 50 years, but Africa
and the Middle East are plagued by large, idiosyncratic development impediments, including
AIDS (Africa), substantial civil conﬂict, ethnic cleansing, and repressive, nondemocratic in-
stitutions. Latin America has not been aﬀected by these problems nearly as much as either
Africa or the Middle East. Viewed in this light, Latin America is perhaps the most puzzling
regional development failure of the last 50 years.8
4. TFP Is the Cause of Latin America’s Stagnation
We evaluate Latin America’s stagnant relative income by decomposing output per
adult (Y/N) into two components: output per worker (Y/L) and the number of workers









This decomposition shows that Latin America’s stagnation is the consequence of either low
worker eﬃciency (Y/L) or low employment (L/N). Table 4 shows that employment is not
the key factor accounting for Latin America’s stagnation. Latin America’s employment rate
is on average about 70 percent as high as in Europe and in the United States. This gap is
signiﬁcant, but is clearly not large enough to account for the fact that Latin America has
only 25 percent of U.S. per capita income.9
This ﬁnding implies that productivity is the key factor. Figure 6 establishes this by
showing labor productivity for Latin America, Europe, and Asia between 1950 and 2000.
8Barro’s (1991) ﬁnding that a Latin American dummy variable in his growth regression exerts a larger
negative eﬀect than the African dummy variable is consistent with this view.
9Interesting studies of this labor supply gap include Heckman and Pages (2003) and Caballero et al.
(2004).
8These productivity data are measured relative to the U.S. productivity level. These data
show that the primary reason behind the output catch-up in Europe and Asia is that labor
productivity in these countries is catching up to the U.S. level. The ﬁgure also shows that
Latin America’s stagnation is because of stagnant productivity. In particular, Latin American
productivity was 33 percent of the U.S. level in 1950 and 32 percent of the U.S. level in 1998.
In contrast, European productivity rose from 39 percent of the U.S. level to 79 percent of
the U.S. level in 1998, and Asian productivity rose from 15 percent of the U.S. level to 54
percent of the U.S. level over the same period.
This section investigates Latin American labor productivity by decomposing produc-
tivity into two pieces: physical capital per worker and the eﬃciency of production (TFP).
We then evaluate the relative contribution of each of these components to Latin America’s
labor productivity gap. The relative size of these two factors is important for understanding
why Latin American productivity is not catching up. If TFP is the dominant factor, then we
should be formulating explanations for why production eﬃciency is so much lower in Latin
America than in the United States. Alternatively, if low capital per worker is the dominant
factor, then we should be formulating explanations for why capital formation is so much lower
in Latin America than in the United States.




































Before proceeding, note that TFP contributes to changes in labor productivity in two
ways. There is a direct eﬀect, as TFP shifts the production function, and an indirect eﬀect,
9as TFP impacts the capital-labor ratio. This latter impact is observed in the Euler equation
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where γ i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo ff r o n t i e rT F P ,n is the population growth rate, uc is the marginal
utility of detrended consumption, β is the household’s discount factor, ηA is TFP, and δ is
the depreciation rate of capital. This shows that the capital-labor ratio is aﬀected by the level
of TFP, by parameter values, and by transitional dynamics associated with changes in the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The productivity decomposition between TFP
and capital per worker thus needs to account for both the direct and the indirect contribution
of TFP to labor productivity.
The ﬁrst step in this decomposition is obtaining capital stock measures. Table 5 shows
decade averages of the capital-to-output ratio for Europe, Asia, and Latin America relative to
the United States. The data are from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993). The table shows that
Latin America’s ratio has been roughly within 10 percent of the U.S. ratio since the 1960s.
Asia is the only group in which there is evidence of a signiﬁcant capital deﬁciency during the
last 50 years. Asia’s capital-ouput ratio was only 36 percent of the U.S. level in the 1950s,
but increased to the U.S. level by the 1980s. These data suggest that a capital shortfall is
not the major factor retarding Latin America’s productivity.
We supplement these capital stock data with capital investment ﬂow data from the
World Bank (2002). These investment data also indicate that Latin America has about
the same capital-output ratio as the United States. Table 6 shows the ratio of investment
to GDP for the United States, Europe, and Latin America. The key point is that Latin
America’s investment share has been roughly constant and is also about the same as the U.S.
investment share. The near constancy of these investment shares also suggests that both
the United States and Latin America have been near their respective steady state growth
paths. This steady state evidence implies the following relationship between investment and











Moreover, since the investment shares are about the same for both regions, we have













This expression implies that the capital-output ratios are about the same in the two
regions, because the sum of these parameter values is about the same for the two regions. This
is because the growth rate of frontier productivity is the same. The population growth rate
in Latin America is slightly higher than in the United States, but Latin America probably
has a slightly lower depreciation rate, since the fraction of its capital stock accounted for by
rapidly depreciating information processing equipment is probably smaller than in the United
States.10
The three observations that (1) Latin America and the United States have roughly the
same capital-output ratios, (2) Latin American output per capita is about one-fourth of U.S.
output per capita, and (3) Latin American employment per capita is about three-fourths of
U.S. employment per capita mean that the Latin American capital-labor ratio is one-third
of the U.S. level. This implies that Latin American TFP is about one-half of the U.S. TFP
level.
We estimate that Latin America’s 50 percent TFP gap accounts for virtually all of its
labor productivity gap. The 50 percent TFP gap directly accounts for about two-thirds of
the labor productivity gap, and we will next show that the indirect eﬀect of TFP accounts
for about the remaining one-third.
To see this, we make use of the fact that Latin America has been near its steady
state growth path over the last 50 years, along with our assumption that the values for the
parameters γ,n,δ,θ,a n dβ are the same in the two regions.11 The steady state Euler equation
10The Latin American population growth rate is about 1.7 percent per year, compared to the U.S. popu-
lation growth rate. See http://www.overpopulation.com/faq/basic_information/population_growth_rate/
latin_america.html.
11Recall from above that the values of the parameters γ,n,a n dδ a r ea b o u tt h es a m e .R e g a r d i n gθ, Gollin












TFP is the eﬃciency with which an economy uses its capital and labor services. The
following sections evaluate some possible factors that might account for Latin America’s
TFP gap, including human capital and barriers to competition. We will focus our empirical
evaluation on whether these factors can account for Latin America’s 50-year relative TFP
stagnation.
5. Human Capital Is Not a Major Factor
Our analysis has measured labor services as employment, without any adjustment for
diﬀerences in human capital between regions. This suggests that diﬀerences in measured
TFP across countries may in part be due to diﬀerences in human capital. It is important to
know how much of Latin America’s TFP stagnation is due to human capital, because optimal
government policies, and how fast they impact the economy, may likely depend on how much
of Latin America’s TFP gap is due to human capital.
If human capital diﬀerences are the main stagnation factor, then we should observe
Latin America’s relative human capital stagnating and human capital in the European and
Asian countries rapidly catching up to the United States. Moreover, a human capital-based
explanation makes two other empirical predictions: (1) Latin America should have a very
low ratio of human capital to output compared to the United States, and (2) Latin American
TFP levels should be similar to those in the United States after adjusting TFP for human
capital diﬀerences between the two regions. We will show that neither of these predictions is
consistent with the data.
Regarding TFP as a stagnation factor, Table 7 shows relative human capital levels in
(2002) shows that income shares are quite similar across countries once uniform accounting procedures are
used to allocate entrepreneurial income. We assume that diﬀerences in β are small, because otherwise the
rate of return to physical capital in Latin America would systematically be much higher than in the United
States. We are unaware of evidence supporting this view.
121960 and 1990 for Latin America and the other regions using Bils and Klenow’s (2000) human
capital measures. The patterns in this table don’t account for the very diﬀerent patterns in
output per worker over time between Latin America and the other regions, because human
capital in all the regions is catching up to the U.S. level, and Latin America’s increased the
most. Speciﬁcally, Latin America’s relative human capital increased by 19 percent between
1960 and 1990, Europe’s increased by 12 percent, and Asia’s increased by 9 percent. These
changes suggest Latin America should have had the fastest catch-up of the three regions.
This prediction stands in sharp contrast to the actual patterns of development.
The Bils-Klenow data suggest that human capital is not the factor that distinguishes
the development successes in Europe and Asia from Latin America’s stagnation. The fact
that Latin America’s relative output continues to decline, despite this signiﬁcant increase in
human capital, indicates that a diﬀerent factor is driving down Latin American relative TFP
and output. Moreover, the fact that Europe and Asia have gained 30 and 40 percentage
points, respectively, on the United States, despite only about 10 percentage point catch-ups
in human capital, suggests that another factor is driving these successful countries.
This conclusion is robust to measuring human capital using average years of schooling.
For example, the relative years of schooling in the population aged 25 and older in Latin
America rose from 36 percent of the U.S. level in 1960 to 41 percent in 1990. During the
same period, Europe’s relative educational attainment fell from 69 percent of the U.S. level
in 1960 to 63 percent in 1990, while our Asian countries rose from 62 percent in 1960 to 67
percent in 1990. As with the Bils-Klenow data, these changes do not account for why Europe
and Asia are development successes, and why Latin America has stagnated.
Country-level schooling measures also support this view, because some Latin American
countries have a higher average schooling attainment than many of the Asian and southern
European development successes. In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, for example, the average
years of schooling of the population aged 25 and over was 7.8, 6.2, and 6.7, respectively, in
1990, which exceed the average number of years of schooling of 3.6 years in Portugal, 6.3 years
in Spain, and 5.5 years in Singapore. Despite more years of schooling, income in these Latin
American countries is much lower than income in these other countries. Output per adult as
a fraction of U.S. income in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay was 29 percent, 36 percent, and
1327 percent, respectively, in 2001, while relative per capita income in Portugal, Spain, and
Singapore was 51 percent, 56 percent, and 75 percent, respectively.
A second reason that human capital is not the key factor is Latin America’s relative
ratio of human capital to output. Speciﬁcally, if human capital were the key factor, then
Latin America should have a relatively low ratio of human capital to output, just as if
physical capital were a major factor behind Latin America’s low labor productivity, then
Latin America should have a relatively low ratio of physical capital to output. In contrast,
Latin America has a very high relative supply of human capital. In particular, the Bils-
Klenow data imply that Latin America’s human capital-output ratio is 140 percent higher
than that in the United States. For comparison, we note that Europe’s ratio is about the
same as the U.S. ratio.
A third reason that human capital is not the central factor accounting for Latin Amer-
ica’s TFP gap is because a large gap between the United States and Latin America remains
after adjusting for human capital diﬀerences. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall
and Jones (1999) construct income level accounting in a single year for the countries in the
Penn World tables, including Latin America. Hall and Jones (1999) ﬁnd an average TFP
level in our set of Latin American countries of 58 percent of the U.S. level in 1988, after ad-
justing for human capital. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, using 1985 data and some diﬀerent
procedures, ﬁnd that these countries have an average of 67 percent of U.S. TFP. Averaging
these two single-year TFP gaps suggests that human capital accounts for only about a quarter
of the 50 percent postwar average Latin American TFP gap we calculated in the preceding
section.
We conclude that human capital is not the major factor in explaining Latin America’s
TFP gap, nor does it appear to play an important role in Latin America’s long-run stagna-
tion. This is because while Latin American human capital is increasing over time, its labor
productivity is falling. Our view that there is an alternative factor retarding Latin American
development is similar to conclusions about the role of human capital in the development
process reached by a number of other authors, including Prescott (1998), Easterly (2001),
Parente and Prescott (2000, 2004), and Hendricks (2002). We consider this other factor to be
ineﬃcient production, either through the failure to adopt superior technologies, or through
14the ineﬃcient use of technologies. A key implication of this ineﬃcient production view of
low TFP–as opposed to the human capital view–is that productivity and output can rise
quickly in response to higher eﬃciency. We will later see in a number of industry studies that
this is indeed the case.
6 .L a t i nA m e r i c a nS t a g n a t i o na n dC o m p e t i t i v eB a r r i e r s
A very old view, extending back to at least Adam Smith, argues that barriers to
competition will discourage innovation. According to this view, countries that have more
competitive barriers will be poorer. We will argue empirically that barriers to competition
are at least part of the reason Latin American producers are systematically and persistently
less eﬃcient than U.S., European, and Asian producers.
Before conducting this analysis, we note that this channel between competition and
productivity is one of the leading channels for understanding low productivity in the theoret-
ical TFP literature. A number of economists are now developing formal models that generate
low productivity as an outcome of competitive barriers. A key challenge in these models is to
rationalize why societies choose to be unproductive. A major rationalizing element in these
models is that a subset of society would be harmed by the adoption of superior technologies,
and this subset has suﬃcient resources to successfully block their adoption. For example,
Holmes and Schmitz (1995) present a model in which groups in an industry have the poten-
tial to block a new technology by political lobbying for new regulations. The group has skills
tied to an old technology that will become obsolete if the new technology is adopted. The
group decides whether to use its resources to block or to learn the new technology. The paper
shows that the group is much less likely to block if the industry is subject to competition
from other countries. Other papers that have developed models in which groups may choose
to block technology adoption include Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999), Holmes and Schmitz
(2001), Cozzi and Palacios (2003), Bridgman, Livshits, and MacGee (2004), and Herrendorf
and Teixeira (2004).
In all of these papers, lowering competition reduces productivity through the channel
of “X-ineﬃciency,” in which an organization fails to produce at its minimum cost. However,
there are other channels through which low competition can lead to low eﬃciency. For exam-
15ple, the government may impede entry by more eﬃcient ﬁrms in order to protect incumbent,
low eﬃciency producers who politically support the government. This view is consistent
with that of Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000), who argue that the political elite are the leading
groups in Latin America that restrict competition. In the next section we establish that
Latin America erects signiﬁcantly more competitive barriers than the successful countries in
Europe and Asia. We will then show that changes in the degree of competitive barriers in
Latin America have large and systematic eﬀects on productivity.
7. Latin America Puts Up Signiﬁcant Competitive Barriers
We now focus on government policies that restrict competition. We do this because of
our view that policy is central for sustaining persistent competitive barriers. We will examine
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent types of barriers that we categorize as either international competitive
barriers, including tariﬀs, quotas, multiple exchange rate systems, and regulatory barriers
to foreign producers, and domestic competitive barriers, including entry barriers, ineﬃcient
ﬁnancial systems, and large, subsidized state-owned enterprises.
We will present evidence that shows that Latin America has constructed many inter-
national and domestic barriers that have closed oﬀ Latin America from both internal and
external competition. Both the breadth and depth of Latin American barriers signiﬁcantly
exceed those in Europe and other successful countries. The breadth and depth of Latin Amer-
ican barriers are important, because the impact of competitive barriers rises nonlinearly with
the number of barriers that are adopted. More speciﬁcally, competitive barriers are comple-
ments. For example, we will show that Latin America has regulations that signiﬁcantly raise
domestic entry costs. Moreover, we will show that Latin America also has had high tariﬀs,
which protect Latin American producers from foreign competition. By insulating domes-
tic producers from foreign competition, tariﬀs are a complementary noncompetitive factor
that raises the noncompetitive eﬀects of high domestic entry costs. Our documentation of
Latin American barriers is consistent with Sokoloﬀ and Engerman’s (2000) overall view that
politically connected groups in Latin America restrict competition.
16A. Latin America’s International Barriers: High Protectionism
Latin America has a long history of erecting international competitive barriers to
protect domestic industries that date back to at least the late 1800s. (See Clemens and
Williamson 2002 and Haber (forthcoming).) These barriers include quotas, multiple exchange
rate systems, and, in particular, high tariﬀs.
We now present historical data on these barriers. Before we proceed, it is important
to recognize that measuring the eﬀective level of competitive barriers is diﬃcult, not only
because of the complementary interactive eﬀects of multiple barriers discussed above, but
also because of other measurement problems. For example, some tariﬀ measures are the
average of tariﬀ revenue over the value of imports. This does not measure the extent of
eﬀective protection since the overall cost advantage secured by domestic producers from the
tariﬀ barrier is enhanced by tariﬀs on their product but lowered by tariﬀs on their inputs.
Similarly, quota measures are typically the fraction of goods subject to a quota, but this
fraction does not measure the extent to which the quota is distortionary.
Clemens and Williamson show that Latin American tariﬀ rates were systematically
higher than those in other parts of the world as far back as the 19th century. They report
that Latin America had average tariﬀ levels of 27 percent between 1870 and 1913, compared
to an average level of 7 percent in Asia over the same period. Latin America’s tariﬀ rates rose
substantially in the 20th century, particularly after World War II. There are large diﬀerences
in the pattern of tariﬀs between Latin America and Europe during the post-World War II
period that are consistent with Europe’s rapid catch-up to the United States and that are
also consistent with Latin America’s stagnation.
Between 1950 and 1980, Europe gained about 30 percentage points on the United
States. Tariﬀs in European countries were low. This “golden age” of catch-up bypassed Latin
America, however, which gained only 2 percentage points on the United States during this
period. In contrast to those in Europe, Latin American tariﬀs were high. Table 8, reproduced
from Taylor (1996), shows that Latin American tariﬀs were systematically and substantially
higher than those in Europe during this period. The table shows Taylor’s estimates for
nominal protection for a number of Latin American countries and for the average of the
European Economic Community. The table shows that Latin American tariﬀsa r ea l m o s t
17always much higher than the EEC tariﬀ across all categories of goods: consumer durables,
consumer nondruables, semimanufactured goods, raw materials, and capital goods.
The EEC protection rates range between 1 percent and 13 percent, and the unweighted
average tariﬀ rate for the EEC countries is about 10 percent. In contrast, the unweighted
average rate for ﬁve of the six Latin American countries ranges from 68 percent to 172 percent.
Protection rates are particularly high on consumer goods, including rates of 176 percent in
Argentina, 260 percent in Brazil, 328 percent in Chile, 247 percent in Colombia, and 114
percent in Mexico on nondurables. Protection rates are also surprisingly high on capital
goods, including rates of 98 percent in Argentina, 85 percent in Brazil, and 45 percent in
Chile. We view these rates as surprisingly high, because optimal tax theory in a number
of models predicts that capital accumulation decisions should not be distorted in the long
run. This theoretical conclusion implies that capital goods imports should not be subject to
tariﬀs.
In addition to these high tariﬀs, Latin American countries also made signiﬁcant use of
quotas during this period. For example, Haber (forthcoming, p. 50) reports that the number
of imported goods subject to quotas rose from 28 percent in 1956 to 74 percent by 1974.
Relatively high protectionism in Latin America persisted until the early 1990s. Loayza
and Palacios (1997) show that average tariﬀ rates in Latin America were about 38 percent
between 1984 and 1987, compared to 16 percent for East Asia. Between 1988 and 1992,
L a t i nA m e r i c a nt a r i ﬀs averaged 27 percent, compared to 15 percent in East Asia. By the
mid-1990s, the two regions had roughly similar tariﬀ rates. These authors also show that
high nontariﬀ protectionism also persisted until the mid-1990s.
Latin America’s high protection levels should have closed oﬀ the region to competition
and reduced international trade. We will next show that our development success countries
i nE u r o p ea n dA s i at e n dt ob em u c hm o r eo p e nt h a nL a t i nA m e r i c a .W ed e ﬁne openness as
the trade share, which is the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. Following Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2004), we plot the log of the trade share against
the log of GDP. The idea here is that countries that are small–those that have small total
GDPs–trade more than countries that have very large total GDPs. Figures 7—10 show these
plots for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Both the GDP and trade share data are decadal
18averages, where TSit is the decadal average trade share for country i and GDPit is the decadal
average GDP for country i.T h eﬁgures also include a regression line for the cross-section of
countries from the following regression that is estimated individually for each decade:
TSit = α0 + α1GDP it + εit.
The ﬁgures systematically show that most of the Latin America countries are below
the regression line, meaning they are less open than predicted by the statistical relationship,
and most of the European and Asian countries are above the regression line, meaning they
are more open than predicted by the statistical relationship. This means that the develop-
ment success stories are persistently and systematically more open than the Latin American
development failures.
This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the openness-growth literature, in which there is
no clear-cut empirical relationship between these two variables.12 The Holmes and Schmitz
(1995) model provides two explanations for why there is a systematic relationship for our Latin
American countries, but no systematic relationship in the openness-growth literature. This
is because (1) the impact of openness depends critically on the level of domestic competitive
barriers, and (2) the relationship between openness and productivity levels may be quite
diﬀerent from the relationship between openness and productivity growth.
Regarding the ﬁrst explanation, lack of openness in the Holmes-Schmitz model is
important only if a country also has high domestic competitive barriers. The next section
documents that Latin America satisﬁes these criteria. The second reason is that there is
an important connection between openness and productivity levels in the Holmes-Schmitz
model, but not necessarily between productivity growth and openness. In the language of our
model, this means openness can aﬀect the level of η in a country, and this permanent change
in η would be associated with temporarily higher growth associated with transitional capital
accumulation dynamics. Our Latin American countries are therefore interesting because they
have had low productivity, low openness, and high domestic barriers in each of the decades we
12See Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a survey of this literature and Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) for a
very recent analysis that ﬁnds a small positive relationship between openness and growth.
19consider. These are precisely the countries in which openness should matter for productivity
growth, even if the productivity growth is just a temporary transition to a new level.
B. Latin America’s Domestic Competitive Barriers: High Entry Barriers
Latin America has systematically higher domestic competitive barriers than the Eu-
ropean and Asian successes, including (i) high entry costs, (ii) poorly functioning capital
markets, and (iii) high costs of adjusting the workforce or building up an experienced work-
force. Entry costs can be an important competitive barrier because they reduce the incentive
for ﬁrms to enter an industry. Djankov et al. (2002) present data on the costs of starting
businesses for 85 countries. The data are from 1997. They estimate the entry cost by sum-
ming the individual costs of all the requirements for establishing a “representative” business
in the formal sector, including the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s time, and the direct
pecuniary cost of these requirements, such as ﬁling fees and license fees.
Table 9 shows the total entry costs for Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The estimates
show that the United States has the lowest entry costs and that Latin America has the
highest entry costs. In particular, the total cost of entry is 80 percent of per capita GDP in
Latin America, compared to just 1.7 percent in the United States. These data suggest that
entry costs are indeed much higher in Latin America, and constitute a potentially important
competitive barrier.
Poorly functioning capital markets that impede the capital accumulation of new en-
trants or smaller ﬁrms–and prevent them from competing with larger more established, and
often more politically connected, ﬁrms–are a potentially important barrier to competition,
particularly if entry costs are high and entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained. The extent of
government ownership of banks is regarded as an important indicator of how bank lending is
preferentially directed to politically connected enterprises. Table 10 shows that Latin Amer-
ica’s government ownership share is higher than the European countries’, and much higher
than in our Asian countries or in the United States, where this share is zero. These data are
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
Latin America also has adopted labor market regulations that impede the ability of
ﬁrms to acquire the eﬃcient level and composition of their workforce. In summarizing the
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Heckman and Pages (2003) conclude that while the overall costs of labor market regulation are
quite similar in LAC and OECD countries, the LAC countries impose these costs much more
in the form of job security measures than in social security provisions. Heckman and Pages
conclude that the higher LAC job security costs “likely impair productivity and adaption
to new technology ...” (p. 38). In Table 11 we show one key aspect of the higher Latin
American job security costs. That table documents that Latin America imposes much higher
dismissal costs (measured in terms of months of the worker’s wage) than Europe or Asia, or
the United States where these costs are zero. High costs associated with reallocating workers
from less productive to more productive enterprises could constitute an important barrier
to competition. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) have documented the large extent of this
worker reallocation in the United States. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) have shown in a
quantiative-theoretic model that costly worker reallocation can have signiﬁcant eﬀects.
This section has examined a number of competitive barriers in Latin America, Europe,
East Asia, and the United States. In every case, Latin America has the highest barriers.
Given the complementary interactive eﬀects between these barriers, we conclude that Latin
America has much higher protection rates for their producers than Europe, East Asia, or the
United States.
8. Microeconomic Evidence on the Impact of Competition
We now present microeconomic evidence from Latin America that shows how produc-
tivity and output change when there is a change in competition. Before proceeding, we note
that a number of studies have documented that lack of competition and low productivity
go hand-in-hand. (See McKinsey Global Institute 1994 and IMD 2004.) For example, the
McKinsey studies show that productivity is high when ﬁrms face international competition.
Baily and Solow (2001) review the McKinsey evidence and interpret this correlation between
competition and productivity as one in which competition drives productivity:
“An implication [of the McKinsey ﬁnding] is that some part of observed produc-
tivity disadvantages reﬂects organizational slack or an unwillingness to change
and innovate. This corresponds to the belief, expressed by managers, that when
21pressed by competition they can ‘take some of the cost out of the product’.”
However, Baily and Solow acknowledge that the correlation is open to an alterna-
tive interpretation: more productive industries choose to compete globally. The possibility
of diﬀerent interpretations of this barrier-productivity correlation is much less of an issue
when the approach of Galdon and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2004) is used. They conduct
industry-level analyses in which there is a large, exogenous change in competition, and in
which productivity is easy to measure both before and after the competitive change. For
example, Schmitz (2004) ﬁnds that when Minnesota iron ore producers faced increased for-
eign competition brought about by exogenous changes in the world steel market, their work
practices (the rules that governed employee tasks) changed to achieve a 100 percent increase
in labor productivity.
We follow this approach here by presenting industry cases in which there are large
and exogenous government policy changes that signiﬁcantly aﬀect the level of competition.
Some of these cases will show what happens when anti-competitive policies are adopted.
We ﬁrst present two cases that show the adoption of nationalization policies that destroy
competition by eliminating international ﬁrms from an industry are associated with large
and permanent productivity and output losses. We then present ﬁve cases that show the
adoption of policies that foster competition are associated with large productivity and output
gains. The pro-competitive policies include the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the
elimination of trade impediments, such as quotas, and the elimination of restrictions on the
entry of international ﬁrms.
We will show that the diﬀerent policy changes aﬀect two types of competitive barriers.
We call the ﬁrst type of barrier entry impediments, which keep high productivity ﬁrms out
of an industry. We call the second type of barrier incentive impediments, which reduce the
incentives for ﬁrms within an industry to be eﬃcient.
A. Eliminating Competition in the Venezuelan Oil Industry
We now provide an important case where nationalization eliminated foreign compe-
tition and reduced productivity substantially in a major sector. Our discussion draws on
recent work by Restuccia and Schmitz (2004). Before World War II, Venezuela had substan-
22tial foreign investment in its oil industry. This policy changed with the election of the Accion
Democratica (AD) party in 1945. The party pushed for greater Venezuelan sovereignty in
the industry, culminating in decisions in the late 1950s to terminate international rights to
extract oil beyond 1983. This meant a de facto nationalization of the industry at that date.
Not surprisingly, this policy change led to a decline in foreign investment in the industry.
This declining investment then led the AD party to nationalize the industry earlier. The
nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry was completed on January 1, 1976. Although
industry oﬃcials fought to retain foreign managers after the nationalization, the government
preferred to sever all international ties and largely succeeded in driving out most of the
industry’s foreign experts.
Figure 11 shows output and labor productivity in the Venezuelan oil industry before
and after nationalization. Before 1970, output and productivity rose considerably, growing
at rates of about 4.5 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively. Output and productivity began
to decline after 1970 and fell sharply just before the nationalization. By the time of the
nationalization in the mid-1970s, productivity had returned to its 1964 level and output had
returned to its 1957 level.
Output and productivity continued to fall after the nationalization. By 1985 produc-
tivity had fallen over 70 percent from its 1970 peak, and was at its 1955 level. Output fell 53
percent between its peak in 1970 and 1985, and was also at its 1955 level. It is striking that
the large output loss was accompanied by an increase in employment, which suggests that
the local managers were not nearly as eﬃcient at running the operation as the foreign man-
agers. Moreover, this output loss is not the result of OPEC policies; many OPEC members
increased their output considerably in the 1970s and 1980s, which stands in sharp contrast
to Venezuela’s production during this period. Output and productivity recovered modestly
after the 1985 trough, but remained well below their peak levels. By 1995, which is the ending
year for our data, output had returned only to its 1963 level, and productivity had returned
only to its 1960 level.
We conclude that nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry, which eliminated
the eﬃcient international management of the industry, led to large productivity and output
losses. Restuccia and Schmitz argue that a signiﬁcant fraction of this productivity loss was
23due to the loss of international expertise.
B. Eliminating Competition in the Venezuelan Iron Industry
Restuccia and Schmitz (2004) also show that Venezuela followed a similar nationaliza-
tion policy with its iron ore industry, with similar results. Figure 12 shows output and labor
productivity in the Venezuelan iron ore industry before and after nationalization. The output
and productivity patterns mirror those from the oil industry. Both output and productivity
rose signiﬁcantly until just before nationalization, with output growing at 6.1 percent per
year and productivity growing at 11.5 percent per year from 1953 to 1974. Both output and
productivity fell 50 percent between 1974, which is just before the nationalization, and 1976,
which is the ﬁrst year after nationalization. By 1983, output was 62 percent below its 1974
peak level and productivity was 58 percent below its peak level. As in the case of oil, out-
put and productivity recovered modestly, but remained well below their pre-nationalization
peaks. By 1995, both output and productivity were 30 percent below their 1974 levels.
We now turn our attention to the impact of policy changes that increase competition.
C. Allowing Entry in Chile’s Copper Industry
We ﬁrst show that bringing foreign competition to Chile’s copper industry is associated
with a large and permanent increase in productivity and output. We will show that Chile’s
policy change, which reversed its 1971 nationalization of the industry, reduced both entry
and incentive impediments.13
Copper is a major Chilean industry, accounting for about one-third of exports and
about 10 percent of GDP. In 1971, the largest Chilean copper mines, accounting for about 85
percent of production, were nationalized and subsequently operated by a government-owned
ﬁrm, Codelco. Ten percent of Codelco’s revenues were paid directly to the military. The
remaining output was produced by small, privately owned mines. The key outcome of the
nationalization is that Codelco faced very little foreign or domestic competition. Despite
some reforms by Pinochet to encourage foreign investment in the 1980s, there was very little
13The material in this section draws from Aydin and Tilton (2000), Garcia, Knights, and Tilton (2000,
2001), and Tilton (2002). We thank John Tilton for providing us with his data.
24foreign entry, and Codelco maintained its very high market share.14
In 1990, the Pinochet government was replaced by a civilian government that was
committed to supporting reforms, and at about the same time, copper prices rose. This led
to a substantial increase in foreign entry. Figures 13 and 14 show how output, productivity,
and Codelco’s industry share changed with the introduction of foreign competition. Total
copper output increased 175 percent between 1990 and 2000, which is a growth rate of over
11 percent, compared to a growth rate of about 4.5 percent between 1970 and 1990. Much of
this output increase came from entrants, as Codelco’s output share dropped from 75 percent
in 1990 to 33 percent by 1999. Figure 14 shows that productivity increased substantially
after the introduction of foreign competition. Productivity increased by a factor of more
than 3.5 over the 1990s, which is a growth rate of 14 percent per year, compared to a growth
rate of 3.5 percent per year before 1990. Garcia, Knights, and Tilton (2001) show that about
30 percent of the productivity gain was from higher eﬃciency at individual mines, while 70
percent of the gain was from shifting location, that is, from the production of new entrants.
The fact that productivity grew faster than output indicates that the industry was able to
produce more output with fewer workers.
Figure 15 shows that Chile’s rapid post-reform productivity growth signiﬁcantly re-
duced the labor productivity gap between Chile and the United States. Before the reform,
Chile’s relative productivity deteriorated from 41 percent of the U.S. level to about 30 percent
of the U.S. level. After the reforms, Chilean productivity increased from 30 percent of the
U.S. level to 82 percent of the U.S. level over a 10-year period.
The ﬁgure also shows that U.S. productivity was roughly unchanged for ﬁve years
before the reforms and for ﬁve more years after the reforms. This fact suggests there were
no frontier technological breakthroughs, which provides further evidence that competitive re-
forms were the main cause of Chile’s large productivity catch-up. This suggests that the new,
private entrants increased productivity by (1) mining better deposits, (2) using a superior
technology (that was available before 1990), or (3) having better expertise. The important
14The Constitutional Mining Law, adopted in 1982, ostensibly provided foreign investors protection in
the event of future conﬁscations, but the law came under attack by the political opposition. Perhaps not
surprisingly, there was very little new foreign investment in the industry.
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petitive reforms also led to a productivity increase at Codleco, which owned and operated
four large mines. Between 1990 and 1997, productivity rose by 37, 70, 70, and 84 percent
at these mines. These large productivity gains suggest that the nationalization policy also
dulled the incentives for incumbent producers to be eﬃcient. Despite Codelco’s productivity
gains, there was a signiﬁcant reallocation of production from Codelco to the most eﬃcient
producers. This large loss of market share suggests that Codelco may not have survived in
any form had it not been able to realize these eﬃciency gains after the industry reforms.
We conclude that pro-competition policy reforms that encouraged foreign competition
signiﬁcantly increased productivity in the Chilean copper mining industry by allowing high
productivity producers to enter and by changing the incentives facing the incumbent pro-
ducers. In particular, this case shows that even large and persistent productivity gaps in
quantitatively important sectors can be eliminated quickly when policy fosters competition.
D. Reversing Quotas in Brazil’s Computer Industry
We now show how eliminating a zero quota policy in Brazil’s computer industry is
associated with a large increase in output and productivity. We will show that lifting the
import ban on foreign-produced computers reduced both entry and incentive impediments in
the industry. Our discussion draws on work by Luzio and Greenstein (1995) and Botelho et
al. (1999).
In 1977, Brazil embarked on a “market-reserve” policy for its personal computer
and minicomputer producers. This meant that only PCs and minicomputers produced by
Brazilian-owned ﬁrms could be legally sold in Brazil.15 While there undoubtedly were illegal
purchases of imports by small ﬁrms and individuals, Luzio and Greenstein document that the
black market was not a practical choice for large ﬁrms. The policy thus insulated Brazilian
computer producers from foreign competition, and the policy also featured entry barriers to
new ﬁrms through a maze of bureaucratic requirements. The policy also provided protection
for upstream component producers through domestic content laws that required Brazilian
computer makers to use domestically produced components, including silicon chips, picture
15There were some provisions for production by local ﬁrms in joint venture with foreign ﬁrms.
26tubes, and other standard parts. The prices of these Brazilian components were two to ﬁve
times higher than international prices. The policies also restricted entry into the component
supply industries. (See Luzio and Greenstein 1995, p. 624.)
Under the quota policy, the Brazilian computer producers were not competitive with
international producers. Brazilian computer prices were 70 to 100 percent above international
prices after the policy was adopted. Support for this policy evaporated, and after the 1990
presidential election, President Collor phased out this market-reserve policy by 1992. The
new policy eliminated the quota, included tariﬀso fa b o u t3 0p e r c e n t ,a n dp r o v i d e ds o m e
tax incentives for foreign ﬁrms to produce PCs in Brazil (Botelho et al. 1999, pp. 9—10).
The abandonment of the zero quota policy coincided with large price declines, large output
increases, and large productivity increases. Computer prices fell 43 percent per year from
1990 to 1992, compared to an 18 percent annual decline before Collor’s election. Moreover,
prices fell substantially immediately after Collor’s election.
Luzio and Greenstein use these price declines to infer productivity changes in Brazil’s
computer industry. They estimate that Brazil had a 6-year relative technological gap to the
United States in 1989. That is, the eﬃciency of Brazil’s producers in 1989 was equivalent
to U.S. producers in 1983. Since productivity growth in the U.S. computer industry has
been estimated to be around 30 percent per year,16 this means that Brazil had only about
20 percent of the U.S. productivity level in 1989 prior to the reforms. Brazil was able to
eliminate one-third of its productivity gap, however, between 1990 and 1992. This is striking,
given the very rapid productivity advancements occurring in the United States.
The policy reform also is associated with a large increase in domestic production. From
1992 to 1998, output increased by about 100 percent, compared to just a 33 percent increase
from 1985 to 1992.17 (See Botelho et al. 1999, Fig. 1.) This post-1992 output increase is
probably understated because the sales ﬁgures are measured in dollars, and prices were falling
much faster after 1992 than during the 1985—92 period.
Imports rose 150 percent with the new policy, but despite this increase in foreign
16Source: http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2000/Dec/wk1/art02.htm.
17The ﬁg u r e sw eh a v ef o rl o c a lp r o d u c t i o na r ef o rc o m p u t e rhardware, which includes PCs, minicomputers,
mainframes, and peripherals. Foreign mainframe production was allowed in Brazil before 1992.
27competition, many of the Brazilian ﬁrms were able to successfully compete. Following the
policy change, 6 of the top 10 producers were Brazilian ﬁrms. We conclude from this case
that increasing competition led to large productivity and output advances. The fact that
Brazilian ﬁrms raised productivity substantially and quickly after the removal of the quota
policy suggests that the quota policy retarded the incentives for ﬁrms to be eﬃcient.
E. Privatizing State-Owned Enterprises: Brazilian Iron Ore
We next analyze the privatization of the Brazilian iron ore industry. Our discussion
draws on the work of Schmitz and Teixeira (2004). We will show that the privatization of this
industry removed both entry and incentive impediments and substantially raised productivity.
Brazilian iron ore was historically produced by both state-owned enterprises and pri-
vate ﬁrms. In 1990, SOEs accounted for about 60 percent of production and private ﬁrms
about 40 percent. The state-owned portion of the industry was composed of two ﬁrms: CSN
(Cia. Siderurgica Nacional) and CVRD (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce). Almost all of the
SOEs’ production was accounted for by CVRD, which at that time was the largest iron ore
producer in the world. CSN was primarily a steel producer and owned only one small iron ore
mine. Privatization began in 1991 when CSN sold its small mine to private investors. Plans
to sell CVRD also began in the early 1990s, and this led CVRD to change its organization
structure in preparation for privatization.
One of the key organizational changes was in the rules that governed the allocation
of tasks across employees. Prior to privatization, work rules placed signiﬁcant limitations
on the number of tasks a worker could perform. Speciﬁcally, workers had specialized job
classiﬁcations that permitted them to perform only a very small set of tasks. For example,
machine operators were prohibited from making any adjustments or repairs to their machines,
even though some of these repairs were trivial. Schmitz and Teixeira argue that this work
rule policy depressed productivity through similar channels as in Schmitz’ (2004) study of
the U.S.-Canadian iron ore industry.
These work rule restrictions were removed when CVRD prepared for privatization in
the early 1990s. Schmitz and Teixeira (2004) report that interviews with company and union
oﬃcials indicate that the threat of privatization weakened the union, which led to the changes
28in work rules. The privatization of CVRD was completed in 1997 when it was purchased by
local entrepreneurs.
Figure 16 shows output and productivity in the industry between 1971 and 1997. Note
that there was almost no productivity growth between 1973 and 1990. Productivity begins
to grow at the onset of privatization, culminating in a 30 percent increase in 1997 when the
privatization of CVRD is completed. Productivity grew about 140 percent between 1990 and
1997, and output grew about 30 percent during this period. As in the case of the Chilean
copper industry, the Brazilian iron ore industry produced more output with signiﬁcantly fewer
workers following the policy reform.
Figure 17 decomposes overall industry productivity into the productivity at CVRD’s
northern and southern operations and the productivity of the private producers.18 Produc-
tivity at both of the CVRD divisions began growing in 1993, and productivity in the private
mines began growing in 1995. The productivity at all three sets of plants grew between 110
and 130 percent between 1990 and 1998. The increase in CVRD’s productivity is the result
of removing the entry impediments in the industry, as a more eﬃcient group of managers
operated the mines following the privatization. The increase in productivity at the incumbent
private mines is the result of removing eﬃciency impediments in the industry, as these mines
had to compete with a more eﬃcient CVRD.
We conclude from this case that privatizing the industry led to large productivity gains
both at the newly privatized ﬁrms and at the ﬁrms that had to compete with the privatized
ﬁrms.
F. The Large-Scale Privatization of Mexican SOEs
We now explore larger-scale Latin American privatizations. We begin with Mexico’s
privatization of most of its SOEs, which began in 1983. Our discussion draws on work by
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999). We will present data that show privatization of state-
owned businesses is associated with large output and productivity gains.
Prior to the early 1980s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played a signiﬁcant role in
the Mexican economy. They accounted for about 14 percent of GDP and about 38 percent
18Data are available only beginning in 1986.
29of capital investment. These state-owned enterprises operated in a wide range of industries
in manufacturing, mining, and services. Within manufacturing, these enterprises included
producers in textiles, chemicals, heavy machinery and equipment, electronics, autos, and
transport equipment.
These enterprises, however, were very ineﬃcient. They received transfers and subsidies
totaling 13 percent of GDP, which means they were just barely positive value-added organi-
zations. After 1983, almost all of these enterprises were sold to private bidders. La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) analyze the impact of this privatization process by studying the pre-
and post-privatization performance of 170 Mexican state-owned enterprises in 49 industries.
The privatizations occurred over the 1983—91 period. They ﬁnd that output and productivity
rise substantially following privatization. Mean real sales rise 54 percent, and median real
sales rise 68 percent. What is even more striking is that these large output increases occur
despite large labor reductions. Figure 1 in their paper shows that the average employment
level of these enterprises fell by more than half after privatization.
Other performance measures also improve substantially after privatization. Tax col-
lections from these enterprises rise from −4.6 percent of pre-privatization sales to 8.4 percent
of post-privatization sales. The median ratio of operating income to sales rises from −2 per-
cent before privatization to 9 percent afterward, and the median ratio of net income to sales
rises from −13 percent to 7 percent. Both of these post-privatization proﬁtability ratios are
comparable to those of publicly traded, private ﬁrms in Mexico, and nearly 60 percent of
these increases in income are accounted for by higher productivity.
Since the reforms occur during a period of rapid economic growth in Mexico, the
authors also compare post-privatization performance of the SOEs with the performance of
incumbent private ﬁrms. This comparison also shows that the recently privatized ﬁrms had
much larger output and productivity gains than the incumbent private ﬁrms. It is worth
nothing that La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes did not try to account for the impact of pri-
vatization on the performance of the private incumbent ﬁrms, or the broader impact of the
policy change on the aggregate economy. Analyzing these indirect eﬀects would have led to
even higher estimates of the eﬀects of the privatization reforms.
We conclude that the privatizations led to large increases in productivity and output
30for a signiﬁcant fraction of the economy by removing entry impediments. As in the case of the
Chilean copper industry and the Brazilian iron ore industry, output expanded substantially
with signiﬁcantly fewer workers.
G. The Large-Scale Privatization of Argentinian SOEs
Argentina also privatized many of its SOEs in the 1990s. Galiani et al. (2001) study the
privatization of these state enterprises. In contrast to Mexico, most Argentinian state-owned
enterprises were large vertically integrated “natural” monopolies (e.g., electricity, transport,
and communications). When the government sold the enterprises, it often kept the monopoly
structure in the industry to make the ﬁrm attractive to prospective buyers. Hence, the
productivity consequences of privatization might not have been as large under this strategy.
Galiani et al. use a method very similar to that used by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1999) in their study of Mexican privatizations. Even though many transferred enterprises
continued to operate as a monopoly (albeit a private one), large performance gains resulted.
The increases were not as large as in the more competitive Mexican cases, but were still
signiﬁcant. They ﬁnd a median increase in labor productivity of 46 percent. They also ﬁnd
unit costs declined 10 percent and production rose 25 percent.
There is a common theme in these seven cases: policy changes that substantially aﬀect
the amount of competition faced by Latin American producers signiﬁcantly and systematically
change productivity. In particular, these cases suggest that Latin America indeed can achieve
Western productivity levels when competitive barriers are removed.
9. Conclusion
Latin America is a development outlier. This is because it is the only group of Western
countries that are not already rich, or that have not gained signiﬁcant ground on U.S. income
levels in the last 50 years. In contrast, Latin America is falling further behind the United
States and the other economic successes. Latin America is a development failure because
its TFP has failed to catch up. Our analysis suggests that its TFP stagnation is not due
to a human capital stagnation, but is rather due to idiosyncratic and long-standing Latin
American choices that have impeded either the adoption of superior technologies or the most
eﬃcient use of technologies.
31We have argued that competitive barriers are a promising route for understanding
Latin America’s large and persistent productivity gap. This is because Latin America sys-
tematically sets up signiﬁcantly more impediments to competition than the United States,
Europe, or East Asia, and these impediments are associated with low productivity. Specif-
ically, we found that Latin American policy changes that eliminated competition are asso-
ciated with large and permanent declines in productivity and output, and conversely that
Latin American policy changes that increased competition are associated with large increases
in productivity and output in a set of industries.
The key implication of our ﬁndings is that Western-level productivity success is indeed
feasible for these Latin American producers. In particular, when competitive barriers are
eliminated and Latin American producers face signiﬁcant foreign competition, they are able
to replicate the high productivity levels of other Western countries. The key open question
is whether increasing competition in other Latin American industries would also lead to such
large productivity and output gains. More work is needed to address this question, but if the
answer is yes, then understanding the reasons Latin America has set up so many competitive
barriers is central. Potentially interesting avenues for addressing this latter question may
include high inequality, as documented by Sokoloﬀ and Engerman’s (2000) and Acemoglu et
al.’s (2004) general arguments about institutional design.
We hope that these ﬁndings stimulate further work on the importance of competitive
barriers in Latin America. A number of other industries could be analyzed using this ap-
proach, including the privatization of the steel industry. We also hope that this stimulates
work on identifying and evaluating other possible stagnation candidates. Our ﬁndings also
have implications for these other factors. In particular, they suggest that any candidate fac-
tor must satisfy two criteria: (1) it must work through TFP, and (2) it needs to have been
in place for at least the last 50 years. Candidate explanations that do not have these two
characteristics are not likely to be the major culprits.
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38Table 1. Percentage of Latin American Population
of Western Descent, Language and Religion
Descent∗ Language∗∗ Religion∗∗∗
Argentina 97 99 96
Bolivia 45 61 95
Brazil 93 95 80
Chile 95 97 100
Colombia 92 94 90
Costa Rica 94 99 92
Ecuador 65 82 95
Mexico 69 98 95
Paraguay 95 59 90
Peru 52 80 90
Uruguay 96 98 69
Venezuela 89 99 98
Average† 84 94 89
*Descent: the fraction of the population that is white or mixed-white. Data are from Gall
(2004).
**Language: the fraction of the population that speaks a Western European language.
(These fractions are likely understated, because they do not count individuals who did not have
formal education, but who may still speak one of these languages.) Data sources are: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela: ethnologue.com (the total
number of people speaking a Western-European language) and Maddison 2001 (total population);
Bolivia: the share of Spanish speakers in the total population (age 6 or higher), 2001 Census, Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estadistica (INE); Mexico: the share of Spanish-speakers in the total population
(age 5 or higher), Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograﬁa e Informatica (INEGI); Paraguay:
the fraction of the population that speaks Spanish, Portuguese, English, German, Italian, or French,
1992 Census, Direccion General de Estadisticas, Encuestas y Census (DGEEC); Peru: the share of
the population whose native tongue is Spanish (age 5 or higher), 1993 Census, Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica e Informatica (INEI).
***Religion: the fraction of the population aﬃliated with Western religions, that is, Chris-
tianity and Judaism. Data are from CIA (2004).
†Averages were obtained using 2003 population weights (CIA 2004).
39Table 2. GDP per Capita Relative to the U.S.
(Regional Averages for Selected Countries)
Year Europe Asia Latin America
1950 0.40 0.16 0.28
1980 0.70 0.46 0.30
2001 0.67 0.55 0.22
Table 3. Latin American
GDP per Capita Relative to the U.S.
Year 1900 1950 1980 2001
Argentina 0.67 0.52 0.44 0.29
Bolivia - 0.20 0.14 0.09
Brazil 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.20
Chile 0.48 0.40 0.31 0.36
Colombia 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.18
Costa Rica - 0.21 0.26 0.22
Equador - 0.19 0.22 0.14
Mexico 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.25
Paraguay 0.25 0.18 0.18 0.11
Peru 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.13
Uruguay 0.54 0.49 0.35 0.27
Venezuela 0.20 0.78 0.55 0.30
Average∗ 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.22
*The average is computed using all of the available data in each year and is population
weighted.
40Table 4. Employment Rates by Region
(Regional Averages for Selected Countries)
Year Europe Asia Latin America U.S.
1950 0.43 0.41 0.34 .40
1973 0.42 0.44 0.31 .41
1998 0.41 0.49 0.35 .48
Table 5. Capital-to-Ouput Ratios by Decade Average
Relative to the U.S.*
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s
Europe 0.79 0.91 1.03 1.12
Asia 0.36 0.51 0.77 0.98
Latin America 0.83 0.88 0.89 1.07
Table 6. Investment-to-Output Ratios by Region
(Regional Averages for Selected Countries)
Year Europe Asia Latin America U.S.
1960s 0.32 0.33 0.21 0.19
1970s 0.26 0.34 0.24 0.20
1980s 0.22 0.30 0.21 .0.20
1990s 0.21 30 0.21 0.18
Table 7. Bils-Klenow Relative Human Capital Levels
(Regional Averages for Selected Countries, U.S. = 100)
1960 1990
Latin America 46 55
Europe 65 73
Asia 66 73
∗King and Levine (1994) also construct capital-to-output series for a wide variety of countries.
The implications of their data for the relative value of the ratio for Latin America is quite similar
to Nehru and Dhareshwar’s (1993).
41Table 8. Nominal Rates of Protection in 1960
L a t i nA m e r i c aa n dt h eE E C
Country Nondurables Durables Semi-Mfg. Raw Materials Capital Goods Average
Argentina 176% 266% 95% 55% 98% 138%
Brazil 260% 328% 80% 106% 84% 172%
Chile 328% 90% 98% 111% 45% 134%
Colombia 247% 108% 28% 57% 18% 92%
Mexico 114% 147% 28% 38% 14% 68%
Uruguay 23% 24% 23% 14% 27% 22%
EEC 17% 19% 7% 1% 13% 11%
Table 9. Business Start-up Costs
Fraction of per Capita GDP
Region United States Europe Asia Latin America
Total 1.7 36 24 80
Table 10. Government Ownership Share of the Top 10 Banks
Regions United States Europe Asia Latin America
1970 0 64% 26% 75%
1990 0 40% 21% 47%
Table 11. Mandated Severance Pay
(In Terms of Months of Wages)
Region United States Europe Asia Latin America
Indemnity Pay 0 1.1 1.5 2.7
42